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Abstract
Throughout the country’s history, agrarian reform in the Philippines has long 
been a combative issue and one that is often preceded by some form of instability 
and violence. Used mainly as a tool to garner grassroots support, agrarian 
reforms were formally institutionalized by setting up regulations on land size and 
contracts. Despite efforts to integrate the reforms to the markets, including the 
clustering of small hectares (ha) of land into large corporate estates, the benefits 
of the Agrarian Reform Program remained elusive under conservative demarca-
tions set by regulations, including the definition of property rights, transforma-
tion or maintenance of state structures and the contract limitations to be formed 
at the production level. Land continues to be redistributed favorably to former 
landowner elites. This study finds that inequality in land ownership persists as the 
institutions set de facto political power to the elites. Under this condition, 
the equitable redistribution of land is an impossibility.
The Philippine Agrarian Reform Programs have been hampered by high trans-
action costs and inadequate credible commitments, thus resulting in the erosion 
of market forces and elite capture of institutions. Based on agency theory, the 
existing regulation-based programme, which relies on the state’s power to 
expropriate, should give away to a more demand-driven, community-led Agrarian 
Reform Program that gives the parties more space to negotiate and bargain 
about the final allocation of the land. This involves the promulgation of relational 
contracts and the creation of more democratic institutions.
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I. Introduction
Agrarian reform in the Philippines has a long history marked by instability and 
violence. Following the People Power Revolution in 1986, the Comprehensive 
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), was passed amidst much expectation for change 
and democracy. For the past and present administrations, spanning the country’s 
life, this programme has been the centrepiece for poverty reduction and development. 
Despite its importance, the impact of the programme remains elusive (Balisacan, 
1993; Hayami, Quisumbing, & Adriano, 1990). While there seemed to be evidence 
that the programme has produced some benefits to specific households, the gain to 
society as a whole has not been resolved (Reyes, 2002; Ballesteros & Bresciani, 
2008).
The debate on agrarian reform originally revolves around two main themes. 
First, the relationship of tenure reform to overall productivity has been asserted 
and eventually challenged (see Adamopolous & Restuccia, 2019). Over several 
decades, the demand for tenure reform has changed or altered dramatically 
towards agrarian reform, which, as defined here, not only points to the change in 
the relationship between landowners and tenants but also its role in productivity. 
Hence, agrarian reform refers not only to a redistribution of land, which had led 
to smaller farms but also the provision of infrastructure, services and agricultural 
development. Unlike land reform which refers to a narrower redistribution of 
land, usually to a limited group of beneficiaries, such as the tillers, agrarian reform 
has a broader set of objectives, affecting the whole country. While the two 
concepts overlap and are often seen to be interchangeable, these are essentially 
different and can be conflicting.
Second, attempts have been made to categorize different types of agrarian and 
land reforms, usually according to their wider political and economic intents. The 
nature of the government enacting reforms and the extent of land redistributed 
are deemed to be significant in addressing the programme outcomes. Thus, 
revolutionary, conservative and liberal land reforms may be differentiated (Putzel, 
1992). These categories are demarcated by the policy about several variables, 
including the form of property rights, transformation or maintenance of state 
structures and the process through which agrarian reform is achieved. For instance, 
‘revolutionary’ reforms have often followed political uprisings that change state 
regimes. The state might expropriate a large amount of agricultural land, 
redistribute it in collectives and plan for agrarian reform within a wider purpose 
of social change. A ‘conservative’ reform, conversely, leaves the basic social and 
political framework intact and usually redistributes less land. Land tends to be 
purchased by the state and redistributed to a particular group of cultivators for 
farming on a family or household basis. A liberal perspective looks at land 
redistribution as a means of eliminating land monopolies, advocating the role of a 
strong state to expropriate land and to create the necessary conditions to enhance 
productivity and improve equity.
Nevertheless, regardless of the political perspectives, the changes in the law 
and the institutions can also be explained in terms of the transaction costs that 
originate from the governance of such laws. Demsetz (1969) and Alchian and 
Demsetz (1973) develop a simpler principle that can be paraphrased as follows: 
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Property rights and institutions, in general, will evolve to minimize the excess 
burden. This is equivalent to saying that the set of institutions which maximizes 
the differences between benefits and costs will evolve. In the end, the succeeding 
institutional mechanism reflects how different parties can allocate resources that 
will be mutually beneficial.
Under this framework, the shift from tenure reform to agrarian reform can be 
seen in terms of the transition from natural states to open access states (North, 
Wallis, & Weingast  2009) or the shift from a dictatorship to a democratic system. 
The intention of the shift is to enforce change in the system of laws and institutions 
that can guarantee greater productivity and lower inequality. Within this process 
is the importance of creating a democratic system that allows a wider and more 
inclusive participation of the majority (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). In which 
case, the solution to increasing the de facto political power of the majority is to 
enhance democratic institutions that limit the power of the rentiers and the elite to 
capture the institutions (Assiotis & Sylwester, 2014; De la Croix & Delavallade, 
2011).1
The objective is to trace how the Philippine Agrarian Reform Program had 
evolved from land reform to agrarian reform. It is argued that the evolution of 
the law and the development of the institutions come from the need to address the 
inefficiencies emerging from the economic and social environment.  However, 
the level of transaction costs and the lack of credible commitments have produced 
outcomes that are far from those envisioned in the programme. Furthermore, 
because the law contradicted market forces, the law had become a constraint to 
development. Unless institutions become more democratic and more market-led, 
social programmes such as agrarian reform will only be stifled by elite interests.
This article is organized as follows: Section II considers a review of the 
literature, looking into the reasons why land and agrarian reform were deemed 
necessary for economic development. Section III highlights the main outcomes of 
the agrarian and land reforms in the Philippines. Section IV discusses the historical 
evolution of agrarian reform n the Philippines. Section V provides the lessons 
learnt in terms of the theory and the empirical. Section VI provides a summary 
and policy directions.
II. Towards Understanding the Impact of Agrarian 
Reform
The Agrarian Reform Program has been justified for two main reasons. The first 
is to introduce greater efficiency in agricultural production in terms of land size. 
This is based on the notion that smaller-sized farms (due to the agrarian reform) 
are more productive than larger-sized farms. A common argument to support this 
notion is that family labour has greater productivity than hired labour in smaller 
farms (Berry & Cline, 1979; Carter, 1984; Cornia, 1985; Banerjee, 2000). 
Furthermore, the elimination of the shared tenancy arrangement, which is part of 
the whole reform, programme is also considered as a critical ingredient in the 
attainment of greater productivity.
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However, as agency theory argues (see Otsuka, Chuma , & Hayami, 1992; 
Huffman & Just, 2004), this view does not take into account the risks that are 
associated with agrarian economies. The theory indicates that contracts can be 
devised that can make tenancy arrangements and varied forms of labour 
engagements efficient (Banerjee, 2000). Hence, previous studies that claim that 
smaller farm sizes lead to efficiency due to agrarian reform may have failed to 
take into account several key factors that can affect the contracts (such as 
supervision costs, technological innovations, organizational arrangements, land 
quality and production risks). While these studies seem to suggest that benefits 
had been obtained by farmers, it is not clear whether these can be attributed to the 
reforms made on the land market. In light of agency theory, the lack of appreciation 
of the forms of incentives that resulted from the change can make such results 
difficult to interpret. What is not clear is whether larger-sized farms are better than 
smaller-sized farms that can organizationally be scaled up. In terms of exploiting 
scale economies, there seems to be no difference between these arrangements in 
terms of the resulting productivity.
Another justification for agrarian reform is to see it as a redistributive policy. 
Besley and Burgess (2000) showed empirically that land redistribution can benefit 
the farmers by removing the intermediaries, such as landlords and lenders, and 
increasing their claims on the returns of the land. Furthermore, by reducing the 
number of workers in a locality (turning them into employers), wages can increase. 
In the process, land reform reduces poverty in the area. In effect, the political 
economy view of the importance of land reform as a redistributive tool has 
empirical support (see, e.g., Vollrath & Erickson, 2007; Deininger & Squire, 1998). 
In the Philippines, high and persistent levels of inequality (incomes and assets), 
which dampen the positive impacts of economic expansion, have been considered 
as one of the main causes of poverty (Asian Development Bank [ADB], 2009).
However, any form of redistribution should be accompanied by a set of laws 
and implementing modes of governance to restore efficiency once the socially 
acceptable distribution has been determined. Based on new institutional economics 
(Williamson, 2000), which emphasizes contract enforcement as an element of 
efficiency, Figure 1 shows how institutions and laws lead to efficient social 
outcomes as countries transition from tenurial to agrarian reforms. 
In this scheme, two key factors are important: The reduction of transaction costs 
and the presence of credible commitments. The former refers to the administrative 
costs of implementing the programme. The latter is related to the development of 
contract-enforcing and coercion-constraining institutions (Greif, 2005). The former 
defines the property rights of individuals according to the law and structures the 
limits that individuals can credibly commit. The latter, on the other hand, constrains 
authorities from using coercion from abusing the property rights of others. These 
two institutions allow markets to produce efficient social outcomes.
Because of the presence of transaction costs and absence of credible 
commitments, the state is weakened and institutions were captured by the elite. 
Moreover, these two factors prevented the institutions from evolving to a more 
efficient status. The political system matters since political power is needed to 
reform these institutions. In dictatorships, it may be easy to define and distribute 
rights since a single authority exists. Under this system, Pigouvian regulations may 
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be enough in bringing about efficiency. In a weak democracy, these regulations 
move against market forces and prevent parties engaged in transactions to 
determine the proper contractual arrangements that will lead to more efficient 
production. Under the existing regulations, the state from enforcing reforms that 
will greater power to the majority. Hence, while the law may provide farmworkers 
de jure political power, the current institutional framework may run contrary to 
credible commitments and provide landowners or the political elite de facto 
political power (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). Under this system, more democratic 
institutions are crucial in strengthening the de jure political power of the majority.
More importantly, the solution calls for the distribution of rights through a 
system of bargaining where parties engage in a given transaction can negotiate 
freely and settle for a socially optimal solution (Coase, 1960). This system will 
require a strong legal system that enforces the contracts. But more importantly, 
the right environment should first be in place so that the elite will be willing to 
bargain and offer settlements that result in greater efficiency (North et. al., 2009). 
By creating more democratic institutions, the farmworkers not only have de jure 
power but also the opportunities to possess de facto political power.
III. Main Outcomes of the Agrarian Reform Programs
The specifics of this agrarian transformation in the Philippines are well known: 
Increasing agrarian distress for farmers with small- and marginal-sized holdings 
has caused declining returns and rising costs, and the resultant reduced surpluses. 
Lack of alternative remunerative employment opportunities has reduced the 
economy’s capacity to generate sustainable livelihoods. The current pattern of 
highly specialized agriculture has also generated a high degree of environmental 
Figure 1. Basic Framework
Source: The author.
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stress through the use of high levels of chemical fertilizers, pesticides and 
groundwater resources.
The redistributive outcome of agrarian conditions then should be seen through 
the decrease in inequality measured in terms of land Gini and then eventually a 
decrease in overall income inequality of the country through the income Gini.2 
Figure 2 shows three estimated Gini coefficients. These are as follows:
Panel A: Land Gini—measured in terms of the number of farm holdings to the 
total area of the farm.
Panel B: Income Gini—measured in terms of the average household incomes 
to the number of households.
Panel C: School Gini—measured in terms of the average years of schooling to 
individuals aged 15 years and above.
Several points can be seen in Figure 1. First, although land Gini is slightly 
increasing, income Gini (Panel B) is relatively stable3 and in certain years even 
present signs of declining.4 This suggests that the overall view that land is the 
most central factor in distributing incomes is overrated. This also implies that 
much remains to be done if redistribution of land is seen as the main objective of 
the programme.
Second, the declining income Gini from 1997 to 2009 seems to follow the 
same pattern of the school Gini (Panel C). Schooling or human capital may then 
be a more potent way of dealing with the distribution, relative to land distribution, 
suggesting that human capital may be underrated. In much of the debate on 
agrarian reform, the quality of human agents or the farmers themselves are not 
often seen, as part of the discussion naturally is focused on the land. This seems 
ironic since the productivity of land is ultimately based on the quality of people or 
human capital of agents who are cultivating the land.
Third, while the declines in school Gini are associated with similar declines in 
income Gini, the latter remains relatively high.  This implies that any significant 
decline in inequality should still be based on property redistribution, particularly 
land reform. However, land reform may not be sufficient since land by itself, 
no matter how fertile it is, will still require other inputs, especially human capital, 
to be more productive than its natural state. In that case, these factors must be 
combined to bring about some meaningful change in distribution.
The fact that land distribution remains unequal is puzzling. From 1972 to 
December 2015, 4.718 million hectares (ha) have been distributed to 2,783,143 
million agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARBs) who have received their certificates 
of land ownership (CLOAs).5 On average, this amounts to 1.69 ha per beneficiary. 
According to the 2012 Census of Agriculture, the country has 7.109 million ha of 
agricultural land, an average of 1.29 ha per farm. This means that the Department 
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) has distributed around 66 per cent of the total land 
presumably devoted to agriculture, with each beneficiary having more land than 
the average farmer. Despite this effort, however, the land Gini has increased over 
the same time.
Moreover, based on the DAR records, the agrarian reform programme is on the 
verge of completion. Table 1 shows the land acquisition and distribution (LAD) 
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Figure 2. Land, Income and School Gini Coefficients, Selected Years
Source: Panel A was adapted from APPC (2007). The 2012 figures are the author’s computation 
from PSA, Census of Agriculture and Fishery. Panel B was from the Philippine Statistical Authority 
and panel C was from the World Bank.
Panel A: Land Gini
Panel B: Income Gini
Panel C: School Gini
Table 1. LAD Accomplishment by Target Scope and Mode of Acquisition, as of 31 December 2015
Land Type/Mode of Acquisition
Total Working 
Scope* (in ha)
Total Area Accomplished 
as of 31 Dec 2015 (in ha)
Accomplished as a 
Percentage of Working Scope
Remaining Balance as of 
01 Jan 2016 (in ha)
  Private Agricultural Lands (PAL) 3,184,041 2,608,769 81.9 575,272
  Operation Land Transfer (OLT) 616,301 594,175 96.4 22,126
  Gov’t Financial Institutions (GFI) lands** 185,019 171,391 92.6 13,628
  Compulsory acquisition (CA) 767,359 357,089 46.5 410,270
  Voluntary offer to sell (VOS) 752,987 650,544 86.4 102,443
  Voluntary land transfer (VLT) 862,375 835,570 96.9 26,805
Non-Private Agricultural Lands (Non-PAL) 2,155,889 2,110,076 97.9 45,813
  Settlements 827,772 812,227 98.1 15,545
  Landed Estates 88,079 81,498 92.5 6,581
  Government-owned lands (GOL)/KKK 
lands
1,240,038 1,216,351 98.1 23,687
National/ Total 5,339,930 4,718,845 88.4 621,085
Source: Quizon (2019).
Notes: *The total target scope has been computed here as a sum of available DAR data for accomplishment as of the end of 2015 plus balance as of the start of 2016. ** 
GFI lands include those covered under EO 407 series of 1990 and EO 448 series of 1990.
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accomplished by the DAR to their target scope. Note that as a whole, only 11.6 
per cent of the working scope has not been distributed. The mode of acquisition 
that has not been completed can be found in private lands that are defined for 
compulsory acquisition (CA) with an accomplishment rate of only 46.5 per cent. 
To some extent, because these lands constitute mostly the major landed estates, 
the inability of the government to expropriate lands actively under CA explains 
why land distribution remains inequitable.
Figure 3 shows the total percentage of land distributed by mode of distribution. 
The following points are noteworthy. First, most of the land distribution, 
amounting to 44.7 per cent, are public lands or non-private agricultural land. 
Second, a significant percentage of the distributed lands are government-owned 
lands, including the ones assigned by the martial law administration of Ferdinand 
Marcos to its programme called Kilusan Kabuhayan para sa Kaunlaran (KKK), 
which amounted to 26 per cent of the lands distributed. This practice of distributing 
public lands was initiated during the Ramos administration in an attempt to 
increase the number of accomplishments. Third, another significant proportion 
was voluntary in nature. These are the voluntary land transfer (VLT) and voluntary 
offer to sell (VOS), which comprised 18 per cent and 14 per cent of the total 
distributed lands, respectively. In effect, only a minor proportion of the distributed 
land is compulsory in nature. These modes are CA and operation land transfer 
(OLT), which comprise 7 per cent and 12 per cent of the total distributed land, 
respectively. Landed estates only contributed 2 per cent of the distributed land.
Figure 3. Hectares of DAR Distributed Land by Mode of Distribution, 1972–2016
Source: Quizon (2017).
Notes: The distributed lands can be defined into two. The first is Land Bank (LBP)-compensable 
which include VOS, Voluntary Offer to Sell; CA Compulsory Acquisition; OLT Operation Land 
Transfer of Rice and Corn farms; and GFI, Lands foreclosed by Government Financial Institutions. The 
second is the LBP-non-compensable lands such as VLT, Voluntary Transfer; GOL/KKK, Government-
owned lands and Kilusan Kabuhayan sa Kaunlaran program (KKK); SE (Government settlements); and 
Les, Landed Estates.
10 Millennial Asia 
Another way of viewing the outcome of agrarian reform is to consider Table 2, 
which considers the top owners of land and the percentage of the area they own. 
Note that in 1960, the top 5.5 per cent of the farms (i.e., owning more than 10 ha) 
possessed 38.3 per cent of the land area, but between 2002 and 2012, the share 
of the same landowners to total farms which declined by more than half the 
percentage (58 per cent), the total percentage of these farms to the total land area 
had not declined as much (38 per cemt), suggesting greater inequality. At the same 
time, land to labour ratio had declined., indicating less accessibility to land for 
many farm workers. Because of this, as land became more scarce, the value of 
land owned in larger proportions by rich individuals had increased.
Thus, while the main objective of the Agrarian Reform Program is the 
aggressive distribution of public land and the widespread use of voluntary sales 
and offers at the lower farm size levels, the distribution of land to farm holdings 
with larger farm sizes has increased, a situation that the programme intended to 
correct. This suggests that agrarian reform remains a serious concern today as it 
was in the Spanish and American periods. As a matter of policy then, the agrarian 
reform should be continued but in a different form.
IV. The Evolution of the Law and the Institutions
The historical development of the Agrarian Reform Program of the Philippines 
has undergone dramatic changes in the post-independence era. It has transformed 
agriculture from traditional to technologically modern and from modern to highly 
capital- and resource-intensive sector. However, the agricultural sector in 
Philippines continues to have low productivity relative to developing countries, as 
measured in terms of the value of total output per worker. Relative to the labour 
productivity in other sectors, the agricultural sector continues to be the lowest. 
Not only has the agricultural sector contributed minimally to the food security of 
the country, but poverty has also remained.
The issue of agrarian reform became comtoversial from the Commonwealth 
period to the Marcos administration (Poblador, 2019). During this period, the 
Table 2. Land Size, Land–Labour Ratio, and Land Distribution, Selected Years
Year
Average Farm 
Size (ha)
Land-Labour 
Ratio
Percentage of Farms Percentage of Area
Above 
10 ha
Above  
25 ha
Above  
10 ha
Above  
25 ha
1960 3.6 1.34 5.5 0.5 38.3 15.4
1971 3.5 1.16 4.8 0.6 33.8 17.1
1980 2.8 1.08 3.5 n.a. 26 n.a.
1991 2.2 0.88 2.3 0.3 23.5 10.6
2002 2 0.69 1.8 0.2 19.4 8.1
2012 1.3 0.68 1.6 0.18 17.1 8.0
Source: Adapted from APPC (2007). The 2012 figures are the author’s computation from PSA, 
Census of Agriculture and Fishery.
Lanzona 11
unequal distribution of land led to social injustice. The Regalian Doctrine (based 
on the Declaration of Alexander, 1493), enshrines an arbitrary, mythical and 
unjust usurpation of sovereignty and customary property rights. This document 
still undergirds the Philippine state in spite of the 2000 Philippine Supreme Court 
decision reaffirming the doctrine of native title (Lynch, 2011). Furthermore, in 
1591, religious institutions allowed to own lands. In 1680, the Laws of the Indies 
has implemented the encomienda system, a process by which large tracts of land 
were entrusted to local nobles, through the law enacted by Philip II, on 11 June 
1594. It was used to acquire ownership of large expanses of land, many of which 
continue to be owned by affluent families. Furthermore, due to non-documentation 
of communal property rights, religious orders (e.g., Jesuits in 1603, Dominicans/
Augustinians in 1740–1745) and local elites (including Chinese mestizo) expand 
their landholdings through usurpation. This resulted in the emergence of a 
commercial export economy, which, in turn, increased the concentration of land 
ownership among the local elites as well as friar orders. Portions of these hacienda 
estates were leased to inquilinos (fixed-rate tenants) who, in turn, sub-lease to 
kasamas (sharecroppers).
The Maura Law of 1894 reverted all undocumented lands to the state. This 
provided a legal foundation for the Regalian Doctrine, which was, in turn, used by 
the US colonial regime to deny ancestral property rights (Lynch, 2011). Under 
this system, prominent families acquire landholdings through usury, which 
becomes widespread. Absentee ownership became common. While landowners 
comprised mostly of religious orders and caciques (with a growing number of 
mestizos, other agrarian structures, however, emerged. In particular, the plantation 
owners employed Negroes as day labourers in place of tenants by the 1880s.
When the Americans came, a series of laws were formulated in an attempt to 
redistribute lands to a larger proportion of the population. However, homesteading 
failed due to landlord manipulation, unsystematic surveying, tough standards for 
productivity, lack of infrastructure and credit. Unlike landowners, tenant farmers 
were unable to get legal support due to illiteracy and high costs of the transaction.
With the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935, various 
reforms such as the Rice Share Tenancy Act (RA 1199) established the farmer’s 
rights to the land, and the creation of the National Land Settlement Administration 
(NLSA) opened resettlement projects in Cotabato and Isabela. The year 1935 then 
officially saw the beginning of the land distribution laws created by its government. 
But these did not change the distribution of land significantly due to various 
implementation problems and series of rebellions in the farms that were not 
related to the agrarian laws.
The early postwar period further ushered in a series of reforms intended mainly 
for social justice, intending to redistribute land. In 1952, the Hardie Report (named 
after Robert S. Hardie) recommended the abolition of share tenancy, focusing on 
family-sized farms as the basis of the rural economy in response to the Huk 
situation. Magsaysay, in turn, passed two landmark bills:
•	 Agricultural	 Tenancy	 Act	 of	 1954	 (RA	 No.	 1199)—to	 facilitate	 the	 
transformation of tenants into leaseholders.
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•	 Land	Reform	Act	of	1955	(RA	1400)—provided	the	expropriation	of	large	
estates and distribution to tenants.
However, these reforms were not followed through effectively. Congress 
provided a measly sum for the Agricultural Tenancy Act and exempted sugar 
tenants. Congress waters down the Land Reform Code by setting retention limits to 
300 (contiguous) ha. As a result, less than 20,000 ha were distributed to tillers. More 
importantly, the administration of Garcia began the programme of industrialization 
and along with Recto denounced the Hardie Report as an American ploy to keep 
the Philippines backward.
Amid claims of feudalism, President Diosdado Macapagal introduced a series 
of reforms designed for land reform. In particular, the Agricultural Land Reform 
Code of 1963 (R.A. No. 3844) was passed. This law consisted of two stages: (a) 
convert share tenants to leaseholders and (b) convert leaseholders to owner-
cultivators. The ultimate goal was the ‘ownership-cultivatorship of family-based 
farms’. Support systems were also formed to support this programme. The 
National Land Reform Council (NLRC), in particular, was created to coordinate 
various agencies involved in the programme, and Land Reform Project 
Administration (LRPA) was tasked to oversee implementation. The Land Bank 
was conceived to purchase landed estates and provide assistance to tenants. All of 
these efforts were focused on rice and corn lands since coconut, sugar and abaca 
lands exempted from the programme—with a 75 ha retention limit.
Despite all of these grand designs, the implementation remained wanting. 
Landlords pressured the government to focus on productivity. To avoid land 
reform, these landlords converted the land and decided to cultivate the land 
themselves.	Moreover,	Congress	passed	only	₱1	million	for	the	programme,	even	
though	 ₱1.5	 billion	 was	 budgeted.	 Land	 Bank,	 in	 turn,	 was	 not	 formally	
established. As a result of all these implementation problems, not a single square 
meter was appropriated by 1965.
Leading up to Marcos, registration and tenancy reform resettlement were the 
mechanisms by which the state sought to alter inherited property rights regimes. 
However, the national government acceded to the demands of the local elites 
since it was dependent on their resources for nation-building.
The experience of agrarian reform implementation under Presidential Decree 27 
(PD 27) during the Marcos period was unique for two reasons (Mendoza, 2019). 
First, agrarian reform before and after the Marcos era was implemented under 
conditions of market economy and democratic rule where interest groups are 
stronger and can exert more pressure to the state. In effect, Marcos with dictatorial 
powers could have effectively established land rights across the country. Second, 
agrarian reform during the Marcos era was not only a social justice or reform 
measure but also a part of an overall economic strategy that was crafted by 
technocrats and not politicians nor by peasants. Unlike previous administrations, the 
Marcos period faced market-led pressures from the powerful landlord bloc, making 
the government less dependent on the elite. Agrarian reform was pursued to offer 
full ownership to tenants and tillers. However, this was implemented under the 
rubric of the Green Revolution, one of the three pillars of the Marcos economic 
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strategy, along with export-oriented industries (EOI) and borrowing to finance 
public infrastructure. It was during this period where the issue of productivity 
became a concern, and land reform was expected to be one of the inputs for growth.
Because of the extraordinary powers of the dictatorship, many farmer groups 
supported the Marcos programmes, particularly the Federation of Free Farmers 
whose leadership viewed the central value of establishing property rights to the 
farmers and peasants, who, by this time, had forged a political settlement with 
the Marcos regime. Agrarian reform was accomplished by increased agricultural 
output because of new technologies. Moreover, because the programme was 
limited to rice and corn, land productivity was not an issue as the asset specifi- 
city of landowners was not a factor. Landowners here were mostly absentee 
landowners.
Ironically, however, the design of PD 27 undermined the Marcos programme 
itself for various reasons. First, since the law covered only tenanted rice and corn, 
PD 27 left out the greater number of peasants in areas devoted to other crops as 
well as those with different labour relations such as agricultural or rural workers. 
Second, the noble intent of creating cooperatives through the Samahang Nayon 
unwittingly placed additional burden, if not onerous conditions, before farmers 
could acquire emancipation patents (EPs) or Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs). 
Moreover, the new rice technologies that were introduced made farming dependent 
on foreign-made fertilizers, which were under the control of multinational 
corporations, making inputs beyond the reach of most peasants in rice production. 
Furthermore, since technocrats were in charge of land transfer, peasants had to 
undergo the tedious and gruelling process required by the normal banking system.
With the end of the dictatorship and the ascendancy of Corazon Aquino to the 
presidency, agrarian reform became the centrepiece programme for poverty 
alleviation. Marin, Ramos, and Yacub (2019) discuss the key highlights of the 
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) whose coverage included not 
only rice but other crops as well. The CARP (RA 6657) was actually a by-product 
of the series of advocacies that began during the Marcos period. The grassroot-
level movements, such as the Congress for People’s Agrarian Reform heightened 
the demand for CARP. In the post-Martial Law period, the Constitutional 
Commission of 1986 provided the basic guiding principles for an idealized 
agrarian reform. After this time, Aquino’s Cabinet included the Inter-Agency Task 
Force on Agrarian Reform, and the Cabinet Action Committee and EO 229 stated 
the mechanisms to implement CARP.
Nevertheless, the Cory Aquino government was not stable enough to implement 
a social justice programme for a targeted class of farmers. Apart from increasing 
the administrative costs, having an ambitious programme constrained market 
forces and thus compelled the elite to circumvent the law. These circumventions 
can be due to the following. First, the programme involved not only laws relating 
to agrarian reform but all forms of laws that relate to the land. This could involve 
a complex system of regulations and ordinances that can cause several legal and 
efficiency (or land use) problems. This could create many loopholes in the law, 
hence, resulting in controversies ranging from land valuation (e.g., Garchitorena 
scandal case) to land conversion (e.g., Marubeni case). Second, having a 
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comprehensive programme also implied that the implementation would not be 
confined to the DAR, but required the coordination of various government 
agencies that had to do with economic, environmental and agricultural concerns. 
As more organizations were involved, such as the National Development 
Corporation and the Department of Agriculture, more loopholes could be created. 
Third, there could be a complex system of implementation since different regions 
and crops each had different agrarian structures. In particular, support services 
would have to be as varied as the number of crops, regions and organizations. 
Farmer groups in various places (e.g., Sumilao/Mapalad and Calatagan) could 
then express various levels of dissatisfaction.
The fundamental reason for these circumventions may be traced to two factors 
(Quizon, 2019).  First, the long, delayed legislation on national land use (as anchor 
legislation for national development) was considered as a major constraint. 
Philippine laws lack an integrated approach to the governance of tenure, making 
land administration complicated. Unlike some Asian countries that have a 
comprehensive and consolidated Land Law Code, the Philippines has numerous 
legislation that defines the different policy, legal and organizational frameworks 
related to tenure and governance of land, forests and fisheries. Second, while new 
laws and amendments are passed by Congress, the old laws are not repealed. 
Sections of old laws are merely superseded, replaced or amended, in part, by the 
new laws, and this system allows the old laws to retain their residual validity.
These transaction costs resulted in a complex system of legal jurisprudence 
that only lawyers could navigate. The country has taken on a highly sectoral or 
landscape approach to land/natural resource policy, tenure reforms and land 
administration. There is CARP covering public alienable and disposable (A&D) 
lands and private agricultural lands, the Fisheries Code covering municipal waters 
and Indegenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA) for ancestral domains. Besides, there 
are the Mining Act, National Integrated Protected Area Systems (NIPAS) Act, 
Forestry Code, Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act (AFMA) and others. 
The lack of synchronization of policy has resulted in a complex and fragmented 
landscape of laws. Sectoral approaches to land policy lead to overlapping 
jurisdictions and functional overlaps among agencies. For example, the revised 
Forestry Code of 1975 stipulates that all lands above 18 degrees slope automatically 
belong to the state and classified as forest lands. Also, ancestral domains overlap 
with national parks and protected areas. Ancestral land rights are further eroded 
by mining and land concessions, and by agrarian reform titles and forestry 
stewardship agreements.
These costs imposed significant stress on the capacity of the implementing 
institution, causing the failure to meet its deadline and thus the need for a new law 
called CARPER or Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program Extension with 
Reforms. For its part, the DAR had to go over voluminous land records and land 
surveys to verify claims and conduct their land surveys. Given the poor condition, 
if not the absence, of such documents, this process created delay.
Consequently, inefficiencies from the previous administrations will have to be 
covered and resolved by the succeeding administrations, thereby creating even 
greater delays. To make for time, DAR, had to create new forms of land ownership 
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distributions, such as the Collective Certificate of Ownership, which is a certificate 
of property rights for the community, not to individual farmers. This created more 
problems of distribution as no single owner was identified. Furthermore, as the 
programme is delayed, there is the issue of demography as the beneficiaries will 
now be much older and perhaps unlikely to work on the land.
Nevertheless, an important development of the Philippine agrarian experience 
was the evolution of the agrarian reform communities (ARC) approach. In 1993, 
a review of DAR’s strategy for support services showed that (a) the sectoral 
approach to support services by different agencies tended to disperse critical 
resources and yielded very little impact; (b) the intended radiation effects of 
agrarian reform projects were not evident in many projects due to inadequate 
social preparation and lack of technical competence of DAR implementers; and 
(c) the lack of resources for support services without clear prioritization has 
lessened its development impact to CARP areas (Balisacan, Edillon, Briones, 
Abad-Santos, & Piza, 2007).
In the succeeding years, DAR launched the ARC approach for Program 
Beneficiaries Development. By identifying barangays or clusters of barangays 
with the highest concentration of ARBs and distributed lands, resources could be 
pooled where they were needed most (Limbo, 2018). The ARC was also seen as a 
way to fast-track the improvement of farm productivity and social infrastructure 
building—by facilitating the convergence of programmes and services of different 
agencies (e.g., infrastructure facilities, irrigation, power, agricultural extension, 
credit) for selected communities).
A recent study by Philippine Center for Economic Development [PCED] 
(2016) showed that being a beneficiary and residing in an ARC were associated 
with higher per capita incomes. On the assumption that outlays for land distribution 
would be recoverable, it was observed that incremental benefits of the ARC 
strategy outweighed its costs and, moreover, that the ARC strategy was more cost-
effective for improving per capita incomes over time than the Department of 
Agriculture programmes.
Because of the emergence of ARCs as viable operations, many investment 
companies negotiated only with the leaders, bypassing governance procedures of 
the cooperatives. Additionally, some cooperative officers were suspected of 
colluding with the investor in the negotiation of venture contracts. In other 
instances, officers of the cooperative had entered into contracts without consulting 
the membership. Many lacked the technical skills and capacities required by 
entrepreneurship. However, agrarian reform lands with existing agribusiness 
venture agreements (AVAs) were not part of the priority areas of all FAPs. To 
address these issues, an Administrative Order (AO) No 9, in 2006, was passed to 
mandate DAR to review and approve all AVA contracts.
As Borras, Carranza, and Franco (2007) pointed, these ARC and AVA 
programmes are ultimately attempts at aligning the programme to market forces. 
Because increasing returns to land are crucial to agricultural development, the land 
sales and rental markets can be counteracting the principles of agrarian reform, 
with emphasis on removing existing ‘land size ceiling laws’ and transforming land 
reform certificates into negotiable financial instruments (‘collateral’).
16 Millennial Asia 
The main problem is that these recent government interventions not only 
dislocated the production process but also the organizational structure of the rural 
economy (Goño, 2019). With the current systems of regulations and controls, the 
elite has found new ways of maintaining their control. Unless the government can 
establish the institutions that can minimize these transaction costs, the farmers 
may engage in various formal or informal arrangements with other farmers 
(including the previous landowners) that may be inefficient. Hence, even if 
support services are available, there is no guarantee that the emerging contracts 
will be beneficial to the CARP beneficiaries.
Contractual arrangements with ARBs can be seen as mechanisms that allow 
different parties to adapt to the property rights restrictions posed by agrarian 
reform. In the course of implementing the current reform, its intended beneficiaries 
found themselves in a position in which they were likely to be disadvantaged in 
hold-up situations occasioned by these new arrangements. In a situation of 
inequality and heavy regulation, contracts as products of interaction between 
fundamentally opposed interests may, instead, be more heavily protective of one 
party and detrimental to the other. These are due to two types of transaction costs, 
asset specificity on the part of the asset owner and opportunism due to lack of 
transparency and regulation. Asset specificity limits the options of the farmer 
beneficiaries to engage in and own their production activities, while opportunism 
leads to coercion.
The reality is that many commercial farms are characterized by specific assets 
because of (a) temporal specificity and coordination and (b) co-specialized assets 
(Goño, 2019). Before agrarian reform, lease agreements with big landowners of 
both private and public lands mimicked vertical integration,6 assuming farm 
production risks to ensure quality, volume and throughput. After land redistribution, 
the parties have changed, but the drive to manage risks by simulating vertical 
integration remains a challenge.
In the absence of any organizational support, ARBs can only engage in various 
forms of contracts. These may include (a) informal arrangements such as Prenda 
(Lease) and Arriendo (Rent); (b) Stock Distribution; (c) Joint Ventures; (d) Long-
term Lease Contracts; and (e) Contract Growing Agreements. The decision as to 
which contract will be chosen will be based on reputation and trust, barriers to entry 
and attitudes towards risks between the parties involved. However, given the present 
law which restricts the land sizes and the tenurial arrangements, the wrong contracts 
can be chosen.
Another type of transaction cost is the lack of transparency arising from the 
presence of pre-contractual opportunism. For instance, effects of the deferment 
period on the selection of ARBs can lead to problems and irregularities concerning 
resigned workers, retired workers, retrenchment, death of potential ARB, polarization 
and infighting among potential ARBs and the non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs)/labour unions that support them. On the private farms, several landowners 
did not avail of the deferment period (e.g., Aquino’s Luisita and the Javellana Davao 
Abaca Plantation Corporation (DAPCO), which was leased to the Dole Stanfilco 
(Banana) division. Other Openings for Pre-Contractual Opportunism include fencing 
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in or denial of entry into ringed periphery (Nestfarms, Inc.; Dole in Compostela) or 
offer of large one-time cash, hiring a prominent member to convince others.
The post-contractual transaction costs referred to hold-up practices of other 
parties as they transacted with ARBs. In the case of Prenda and Arriendo, the 
contract became eventually an effective transfer of ownership. In the case Stock 
Distribution Schemes, inclusion as ARB can become the company’s prerogative, 
in terms of the manner of distribution of stock shares, the referendum to approve 
the scheme can be affected by their other considerations such as whether their 
share depends on the length of service, the debt of gratitude towards landowners 
can affect the referendum, etc., and eventual land distribution. In the case of 
joint transfers, ARBs were unable to opt out of the venture due to strict laws 
or unclear rules on idle lands and may be unable to deal effectively with their 
partners. In the case of lease contracts, lease rates were lower because of the 
market power (or monopsony) of large firms. Finally, in the contract growing 
arrangements, in the early rounds of negotiations, ARBs lacked information on 
expected profits and became locked into long-term agreements with unfair 
prices. Divisions arose regarding how to exit or renegotiate contracts. In some 
cases, cooperatives broke apart, and the DAR had to partition the CLOA among 
irreconcilable groups.
V. Lessons from the Historical Analysis
The above section looked at the issue of agrarian reforms from two main angles: the 
evolution of the law, which was seen as responding to the needs of society, 
particularly in terms of minimizing possible social dislocations and the development 
of the institutions, which have been noted a being organized to favor the elite groups. 
The latter view indicates the movement over time of the provisions and policies in 
favor of the landowner. Two points are significant. First, as far as the provisions of 
the law are concerned, the political rights of the farmers, as opposed to the landowner, 
were protected and even expanded. Compared to the time of Marcos, tillers have 
now a greater chance of owning the land. In the same way, the policies on the 
payment of beneficiaries and support services have been made to bias the interest of 
the farmers. A particular form of innovation during the Ramos period was the use of 
the ARC approach, which considered not just the needs of the individual farmer but 
also the community as a whole, and examined how communities can work together 
to achieve greater production.
Second, despite the enormous power given by the law to the farmers, there 
seems to be greater leeway given to the landowners offered by the institutions in 
terms of area cover and compliance. The following points are noteworthy:
•	 The	 area	 of	 coverage	 was	 estimated	 to	 be	 10.3	 million	 ha	 for	 CARP,	
significantly higher than 1 million ha coverage under the PD 27. However, 
the coverage was down to 8.1 million ha under Ramos’ time, 7.8 million ha 
under Estrada and 5.4 million ha under Benigno Aquino.
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•	 Under	the	authoritarian	rule,	appropriation	of	the	land	was	the	only	option,	
but under CARP, various options to attract landowners to comply with the 
programme has been set up: VOS, VLT and stock options
•	 Under	the	CARP,	the	LAD	process	was	much	more	detailed	and	compre-
hensive than the PD 27. However, over time, particularly during the Ramos 
and Arroyo administrations, various rules and regulations that allowed 
exemptions and negotiations have been provided.
•	 While	corporate	 farming	was	allowed	during	 the	Marcos	period,	clearer	
rules and more comprehensive regulations were later established to allow 
more corporate ventures in AVAs.
•	 During	the	Marcos	period,	land	conversions	were	not	rampant	as	the	cover-
age was limited to rice and corn. Land conversions were not regulated. 
With the greater coverage, there was still no clear regulations on land con-
version. It was only later during the second Aquino administration towards 
the end of the programme that guidelines for land conversion were 
established.
In effect, while the law and support policies, including compensation for land, 
have given de jure political power to the farmers, the institutions conferred on the 
elite de facto political power. In the process, much of the intent of the law remains 
to be satisfied. In various ways, the DAR implemented several measures to depict 
a wide distribution of land, but this did not affect the distribution of land.
Three main factors explain this chain of events. First, the reins of powers 
in government can be characterized as a circulation of the elite. Described by 
Anderson (1988) as a cacique democracy, the history of the country was 
initially dominated by a tribal royalty, known as caciques, that helped the 
Spanish control the country. As a prize, they retained their positions under the 
Spanish rule. In turn, families who originated among the Chinese mestizos 
who bloomed economically under the Spanish colonial regime became the 
new cacique and consolidated their wealth with political power under the 
Americans. With the setting up of Congress, these powers can maintain their 
power even as they compete with each other. As in a Cournot–Nash equilibrium, 
lands will be distributed among themselves with each one ensuring a stable 
amount of profits. Each one working to benefit one’s own interests, which do 
not benefit society as a whole.
When the Dictator Marcos came into power, he sought to demolish the power 
of these elites, which he referred to as oligarchs. Beginning with attempts to open 
family corporations by forcing them to sell shares, he promulgated a relatively 
successful Agrarian Reform Program, which was supported by the introduction of 
high-yielding rice varieties. However, eventually, he too formed his elite: those 
who favor his hold over power and diminishing the power of those who are against 
him. These new elites took over most of the property that was owned by the 
previous elite.
As Anderson (1988) indicated, Cory Aquino’s ascendancy to the presidency, 
while removing the elite class created by Marcos, only restored the old elite and 
their control over their lands. Aquino can be seen as a restorationist as she rebuilt 
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the elite-dominated democratic structure that Marcos weakened during his 
dictatorship. Along with their return to power, these elite groups were able to 
reclaim back their land and other property.
The second main feature of Philippine society comes naturally from the first. 
This pertains to the fragile state and institutions that have made it difficult for the 
state to create efficient public goods that will be accessible to everyone (Hutchcroft 
& Rocamora, 2003). Cacique democracy, as early as the 1960s, resulted in 
uncontrolled corruption and parasitic plundering of public as well as private 
resources.
Because the caciques controlled the reins of power, the state depended on them 
to maintain stability. When Congress finally opened in the late summer of 1987, 
it proclaimed itself committed to land reform and appointed ‘outsiders’ to the 
chairmanships of the Senate and House committees in charge of agrarian affairs. 
However, because the state needed the elite to maintain stability, even those 
Philippine political units which have had the strongest commitment to democracy, 
such as Cory Aquino, have given little attention to the necessary institutions and 
laws. She made no effort to institutionalize democracy and seemed not to 
understand the consequences of the control of political patrons. She seemed 
content in simply restoring the pre-1972 political system.
In the process, the elite was able to capture the institutions and resources that 
implemented agrarian reform. Despite its original intent to restore democracy and 
to implement comprehensive agrarian reform, the democratic government failed 
to commit credibly to the programme, the third element of our historical analysis. 
In a non-democracy, only a subset of the people, an elite, has political rights. 
Everything else being equal, the group that is in power chooses policies that 
maximize its utilities. However, elites typically live in fear of being replaced by 
different social groups or by other individuals within the same group.
According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), in a non-democracy, the elites 
have de jure political power and, assuming no checks on their power, determine 
the policies that maximize their interests (e.g., low land taxes and no land 
redistribution to the poor or middle classes). However, dictatorship can be 
challenged by the vast majority of citizens (for instance, through revolution, the 
poor). Unfortunately, the political power of the majority was transitory as the elite 
can circumvent the law. As in the case of the People Power revolution, the majority 
initially obtained de facto power but eventually lost it again to the elite. In any 
case, the elites prevented such a revolutionary situation by making (empty) 
promises through the passage of CARP, which reflected, indeed, pro-majority 
policies.
After the People Power Revolution, the transition to democracy did not take 
place because the elites controlling the current political system did not want to 
create political mechanisms that forced them to give up their lands or transfer 
greater political and economic power to the citizens. The democratic transition 
will not occur unless there is a threat of revolution (implying that citizens need to 
be organized, otherwise the transition is delayed indefinitely). The strength 
and nature of civil society organizations would be important to the creation and 
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consolidation of democracy. What is needed is a change in the concept of Agrarian 
Reform that would emphasize credible commitments.
Credible commitment occurs if de jure political law determines who can take 
which actions and when. In a democracy, policies are determined by majority 
voting, which means that the citizens can get what they want regardless of the 
power vested in the elite. When democracy is created, objective institutions will 
give citizens de jure political power, which serves as a commitment to more pro-
majority policies, even if they currently do not have de facto power. The main 
difference between policies and institutions is the latter’s durability and the ability 
of institutions to influence the allocation of political power in the future. Policies 
are much easier to reverse than institutions are more durable.
This transition towards greater democracy is equivalent to the transition from 
natural order to open-access order. The natural state is the situation that describes 
the survival of the fittest where the elite will naturally exploit, given their power. 
An open-access order presumes that the control of the political system is open to 
entry by any group and contested through prescribed, and typically formal, 
constitutional means (North et al., 2009).
To accomplish this transition, two obstacles need to be overcome. First, the 
transition begins in the natural (weak) state and must, therefore, be consistent with 
natural state logic. Hence, there must be conditions acceptable to the elite yet 
simultaneously place elites in a situation where it is in their interest to move 
towards more impersonal intra-elite arrangements or work towards greater 
competition rather than being more collusive. For instance, within the class of the 
elites, promotion should be based on merit rather than the identity of the person. 
Despite the possible inequity in wealth, each person should be treated equally as 
citizens of the country, and exemplary behavior, and not one’s position or family, 
should be given due consideration.
The second obstacle is translating and expanding these intra-elite impersonal 
arrangements into the larger share of society. In other words, why would elites 
ever choose to give up their position in society and allow non-elites into full 
participation? Framing the question in this way can be problematic, but it carries 
the necessity for the elites to give something up even if it is not clear that elites 
will ever do that.
Thus, it is necessary to first secure the rights of the elites. By curtailing these 
rights, market processes are constrained, thereby resulting in the circumvention of 
the law. Creating credible protection for elite rights at least holds the promise of 
expanding output or a growing economy. For instance, if growth is improving in 
various sectors, securing elite rights to form social organizations directly produces 
more developed economies and polities. In a situation of economic progress, the 
elites will not only create greater open access to political and economic 
organizations for themselves but also have spill-over incentives to expand access 
along several different margins into the non-elite population. Furthermore, 
securing the rights of the elites will force them to follow the rule of law, which 
presumably protects the de jure power of the non-elite. What provides democracy 
greater stability is the rule of law as both are mutually reinforcing (Rigobon & 
Rodrik, 2005).
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After securing the rights of the elite, a market-led agrarian reform (MLAR), as 
opposed to the traditional expropriation approach, would be the appropriate policy 
in completing the final stages of the current Agrarian Reform Program (Deininger 
& Binswanger, 2001). Commitments can only be credible if this does not 
contradict market forces. As an alternative to the state-led approaches, MLAR can 
be seen as a mechanism that will allow the transition from natural order to an 
open-access order that allows the majority to access resources and obtain de facto 
political power. Instead of minimizing the role of the state, MLAR succeeds only 
in the presence of a strong state. Under an open-access order, all citizens have the 
right to form organizations and access key social protection services to enhance 
the internal and external relationships of their organizations to individuals and 
other organizations. By creating the impersonal institutions that will eliminate 
land monopolies and other forms of market power, the state agencies such as 
DAR will initiate the means for MLAR to be effective. That is, the DAR must 
ensure that MLAR should first and foremost be a community-led program, or one 
that the elite cannot capture.
Conceptually, a community-led reform embraces not only the textbook ‘willing 
seller-willing buyer’ model but also offers a range of variations that include a 
liberalized share tenancy–land rental market approach, doing away with existing 
land-size ceiling laws, and instead pushing for the formalization–privatization of 
‘non-private’ lands and various combinations of these policies, sequentially or 
simultaneously, including land taxes. Consistent with agency theory, regulations 
should give way to more efficient contractual arrangements, and allow communities 
through contracts, to maximize jointly the assets of parties concerned and to 
determine the final distribution and optimal land sizes (Huffman & Just, 2004).
The argument is that, given the asset specificity of the previous landowner, 
transferring land rights to the farmworker will leave the land unproductive. In this 
case, vertical integration is often seen as a solution (Williamson, 1985). However, 
integration involves organizational costs, which can be too prohibitive to the 
farmworkers, as landowners behave opportunistically.7 In which case, given long-
term (or repeated) relationships, each party even without the need for vertical 
integration can form relational contracts with one another. Since there is no formal 
structure within the transaction, anyone can terminate this contract if the other 
party shirks from their commitments (Kvaløy, 2007).
Relational contracts within firms also help circumvent difficulties in formal 
contracting (i.e., contracting enforced by a third party, such as a court). For 
example, a formal contract must be specified ex ante in terms that can be verified 
ex post by the third party, whereas a relational contract can be based on market 
outcomes that are observed by only the contracting parties ex post, and also on 
outcomes that are prohibitively costly to specify ex ante. A relational contract thus 
allows the parties to utilize their detailed knowledge of their specific situation and 
to adapt to new information as it becomes available (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 
2002). For the same reasons, relational contracts cannot be enforced by a third 
party or any regulation and so must be self-enforcing: The value of the future 
relationship must be sufficiently large that neither party wishes to renege.
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By encouraging relational contracts, the government can support the de facto 
power of the majority who presumably already have de jure power. However, 
organizational forces and social movements will be necessary in creating the 
needed push towards the open-access social order (North et al., 2009). Which, in 
turn, results in the formation of impersonal (i.e., non-personality-based) contractual 
arrangements that are intended to reduce violence and encourage social cohesion. 
Without setting any regulation, a strong government can guarantee that these wide-
ranging contracts will be enforced, ensuring this to be market preserving and 
accessible to everyone.
In contrast, the traditional expropriation approach can be seen as autocratic in 
nature (see Albertus, 2015). As in the case of Marcos, authoritarian regimes, 
especially in Latin America, used agrarian reform as a means of obtaining support 
from the peasant groups. As noted by Gregorio (2019), the autocratic regimes, in 
Japan, as well as that of the US colonization of Japan after the Second World 
War, and, similarly, during the Japanese domination in Korea and Taiwan, created 
conditions that generated investments and resources. Part of these conditions was 
its expropriation provision, along with its careful preparation of cadastral surveys 
and titling mechanisms. For these Asian countries, however, the land reform 
programmes lasted only during the autocratic regimes.
For the other land reforms, such as in Latin America and the Philippines, this 
model failed mainly because they did not encourage relational contracts and 
negated the market forces, given the associated restrictions in land transactions. 
Moreover, as these governments tried to make them successful, the beneficiaries 
become more and more dependent on government support for their production 
requirements (Albertus, Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, & Weingast, 2016). In the same 
way, in the Philippines, state intervention in the form of support services and 
organizational assistance became the permanent fixtures of the Agrarian Reform 
Program, even as market forces have generally been eroded by the programme 
regulations.
VI. Summary and Policy Directions
The current agrarian reform has not resulted in a more equitable land and, in the 
process, income distribution. Despite substantial changes in both the law and 
the institutions and the establishment of property rights to the poor farmworkers, 
the elite have somehow maintained thier control over the ownership of these 
assets. The study attributes this to the large transaction costs incurred in 
implementing the programme and the state’s lack of credible commitment.
A total overhaul of the Agrarian Reform Program is then called for. An 
appropriate approach is to revise the current agrarian reform by offering the 
remaining qualified landless farmers a grant or a subsidized loan to buy land. A 
fully compensated land reform must be in place, with the state paying for a 
substantial part of the compensation. The approach is market oriented because it 
is demand driven, as farmers are now given a choice between owning land or 
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using the subsidy for other household needs, such as education or health. Instead 
of the government deciding who will benefit from the reform, the potential 
beneficiaries themselves decide whether they want to go through the various 
bureaucratic processes that they would need to before they get the land. Even if 
the transaction fails, the farmer keeps the subsidy, which he can use for some 
other investment. This solves the hold-up problem since the decision to buy the 
land remains with the farmer.
Nevertheless, to increase the de jure power of the non-elite majority, the 
government must create an environment where the landowner and farmworkers 
can negotiate and bargain for each other’s rights.8 In this market setting, the 
landowner should be indifferent between owning the land and selling it because 
adequate compensation is guaranteed. One way of doing this is by enforcing and 
strengthening the rule of law by improving the justice system. For instance, before 
the bargaining, any form of circumvention (such as land conversions) should be 
made illegal. This means that the courts will have to be more efficient in deciding 
the various legal contentions regarding land transfers and conversion.
Five steps are crucial in creating this environment for the rule of law. First, 
the government must accelerate the administrative and systematic adjudication 
of property rights beginning in areas of high agricultural potential. This involves 
surveying the areas and determining in a transparent and participatory way who 
owns the plot, and immediately issuing a patent, thereby expediting the 
completion of the cadastral surveys and in the medium term, gradually scaling 
it up by expanding to other areas, including urban land. In other words, one 
starts by reducing transaction costs and encouraging the rule of law by clarifying 
property rights.
Second, complementary reforms in land administration should improve the 
security of property rights and make land markets more flexible and responsive, 
that is, the streamlining of titling and registration and a review of the Land Titling 
Computerization Project contract.
Third, over the medium term, the state can enact a Land Administration Reform 
Act. This reform can address overlapping rights claims (i.e., agrarian, forestry, 
mining, ancestral domain, watershed, local government code, etc.). In the short 
term, the government can conduct a comprehensive assessment to determine the 
magnitude of rights uncertainties. Over the long term, harmonize or unify the 
various legal framework for land use and management to reduce overlaps.
Fourth, a progressive land tax should be enforced (Bannerjee, 2000). The cost 
to the large owner should be raised so that the other smaller farms can be more 
competitive. Without progressivity in taxes, and thus without incidental costs to 
the landowner, the elite will find it attractive to get back his land even if it has 
already been distributed to the poor.
Finally, historical evidence shows that the undesirable outcomes in land 
distribution have remained despite the implementation of a long-standing 
Agrarian Reform Program. The fact that land has been even more concentrated 
on a few landholdings suggests that the removal of land monopolies should be 
a high priority. Indeed, the plethora of land market interventions have greatly 
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reduced opportunities for the poor to own and secure land. In turn, the country 
inherited an inefficient landownership distribution that is not conducive either 
to efficiency and investment or to equity and that has often been at the root of 
violence and protracted social struggle. The analysis thus argues for the end of 
the current regulation-based programme and for the establishment of impersonal 
relational contracts that will preserve markets and allow the farmworkers and 
landowners more options in deciding how to achieve their individual goals.
Admittedly, additional research is needed to determine whether these types of 
programmes and subsequent contracts can affect land access, investment, 
productivity and social indicators such as violence. The results of that research 
not only will allow policymakers to make changes as individual programmes 
further evolve but also will provide direct policies for a country that is struggling 
to make land policies more effective.
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Notes
1. The study recognizes the importance of social agrarian movements and assumes that 
these are crucial to social change. However, the focus of the study will be in terms of 
how legal and institutional factors have responded to these movements, especially in 
the way that the ruling elite have been able to circumvent the law by capturing the 
institutions assigned to implement it.
2. The Gini coefficient is often used to measure income inequality. Here, 0 corresponds to 
perfect income equality (i.e., every household has the same income) and 1 corresponds 
to perfect income inequality (i.e., one household has all the income, while everyone else 
has zero income). The Gini coefficient can also be used to measure wealth inequality. 
This use requires that no one has a negative net wealth.
3. While the figures seem stable, the trend is more significant since the assumption is that 
the level of inequality is  even at the beginning undesirable. Any increase whether slight 
or not further moves the country away from this desirable situation.
4. It can be seen that during the time of Marcos, inequality has to some extent been 
reduced because corporations were ordered to start selling their shares to the public. 
Companies were no longer owned only by a single family and their friends but also 
by those who were willing to become shareholders by purchasing stocks. This period, 
however, was marked by corruption and cronyism (Mendoza, 2019), and resulting 
reduced inequality would only be felt in the next few years.
5. By definition, CLOAs are not negotiable land titles but simply a certification of property 
rights.
6. In transaction cost economics, the more specific the asset, the more vertical integration 
becomes efficient (see Williamson, 1985). However, because of significant transaction 
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costs, surveys (e.g., Carter & Hodgson, 2006) have suggested that the relation between 
specificity and integration may not be as straightforward as suggested in transaction 
cost theory—that is, higher levels of asset specificity need not always lead to vertical 
integration.
7. The possibility of hostage (on the part of the service provider or worker) and hold up 
(on the part of the owner of the asset) problems can exist within an integrated system 
since the structure creates the parties to renege on their individual responsibilities, as 
these parties are formally contracted to one another (Grossman & Hart, 1986).
8. Apart from the substantial costs, MLAR has neither explicit targets or the kind of 
land distribution that will be eventually achieved nor a fixed timescale. Substantial 
institutional reforms are thus required to reduce expected bargaining costs of a 
(successful) conventional land reform.
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